

“Consolidation of liners & deployment of large vessels – What are the impacts on BIMP-EAGA transshipment potential?”

9th Philippine Ports and Shipping
Conference & Exhibition



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The Peninsula, Manila

Decreasing unit revenue for shipping lines places huge pressure on cost reduction


Focus on reducing network costs, including lower port costs

Global Spot Freight Rates




- Weak demand growth *and* declining unit revenues....
- ...must cut unit costs, including via mega-vessels, which has exacerbated the supply-demand gap and depressed utilisation levels...and hence revenues
- Situation will continue for the medium term. Hence profitability will rely on further cost reductions and possible M&A activities
- Lines will be ever more focused on mainline network costs
- Ports and Terminals will continue to face downward pressure on their charges and demands for higher service levels (faster turnaround)

Average vessel load factor



FE-Europe route




Safer Together - Filling up the mega-vessels


Economies of scale via larger alliances...

- New alliances to defray risk of introducing larger vessels during weak demand conditions...
- ...and secure enough numbers of vessels that are of same magnitude of size to offer fixed or weekly schedule
- Following P3 rejection, four major alliances created / remain:
 - 2M
 - Ocean Three (O3)
 - G6
 - CKYHE Alliance
- Recent M&A (CMA CGM – NOL; COSCO – CSCL; Hapag-Lloyd – UASC; Maersk – Hamburg Sud) is causing restructuring of alliances:
 - Ocean Alliance
 - The Alliance
 - 2M
- Account for significant portions of capacity on major trade lanes

FE-Europe Capacity Share by Alliance



FE-N America Capacity Share by Alliance



Port Planning & Performance in an Era of Mega-vessels & Alliances

- Infrastructure and services:
 - 18m water depth;
 - long straight / contiguous quays (1,000m or longer) to provide maximum flexibility
 - adequate number of super post panama cranes: outreach for ≥ 23 TEUs across
 - land: adequate yard to support quay face operations & large box exchanges (ideally 600-650m average yard depth / m quay)
 - inland connectivity: gate, road, rail, barge, etc. (for gateway ports)
 - capacity to accommodate all alliances partners
- Major shipping lines want high performance / high port productivity
 - > 35 moves per crane per hour, 230-250 moves/ship hr @ berth for *larger* vessels
 - Reliable berth windows and turnaround time
 - Maersk EEE seeking **6,000 moves** within 24hrs from terminals....but this requires **adequate cargo**
- Major hub ports (& some gateway ports, e.g. Rotterdam) must efficiently accommodate variety of vessels sizes (e.g. from feeder / barges to mother vessels) - flexibility in operations
- **Risk/reward:** investment requirements are higher but in the absence of base-load import/export (IE) cargo, incentives for largest vessels to call may be insufficient – challenge for smaller transshipment hubs, less so for the major gateway terminals...and major TS hubs?




International Transshipment Market

Wider geography of competition and more 'footloose' than import/export cargo, but mega-alliances / vessels may be changing this...

- Key factors or KPIs for **competitive transshipment hubs** include:
 - Proximity to main shipping lanes, thus avoiding diversion costs;
 - Infrastructure to accommodate the largest mother vessels;
 - Low cost operations (container handling charges, port charges / harbour dues, etc.)
 - High service quality, especially productivity;
 - Streamlined customs & trade regulations, including regulation of liner activity relative to competitors;
 - No cabotage restrictions on vessels or feeder on-carriage;
 - The ability to serve a large number of small markets in the region;
 - Stable regulatory (labour, pricing, etc.) and security environment;
 - A dense network of connections & feeders – large lines or alliances may bring their own networks, but once established this network helps re-inforce or 'lock-in' competitiveness;
 - Import/Export (IE) cargo baseload to attract direct calls – the ability for a port to service both transshipment & IE markets is an advantage, but many transshipment ports have thrived without large IE hinterland, notably Singapore, Dubai and PTP
- Mega alliances pose challenges for terminal operators in terms of scale of capacity required and inter-terminal transfers (ITTs)
- Yield per lift for transshipment is less than for IE cargo – implications for terminal financial performance and return on the major infrastructure investment typical of a major transshipment hub


Mega vessels & alliances pose new challenges for transshipment hub competitiveness

- Fully accommodating an alliance in key transshipment (TS) markets (e.g. SE Asia) **may require 7-9 million TEU capacity...**
- ...or mitigate risk with dual hubs (at additional cost & / or inability to fully “re-set” network)
- Thus barriers to entry have risen in some port markets – must build to accommodate the largest vessels and large volumes in major TS markets (e.g. SE Asia). Can no longer enter the market with just ~6-800m of berth
- Threshold for direct calls raised – does this mean “lock-in” for the mega-hubs?
- Strategy of MPA / PSA at Tuas?
- BIMP-EAGA ports too small to compete for international TS: focus on gateway and domestic TS (including roro)



Greater bargaining power to lines...or does size & complexity limit options?

- Lines / alliances now so big & complex they may have less market power: i.e. too large to move easily – in SE Asia, there are few options for a “mega-hub” with *available* capacity.
- TS market appears to be slowing, even *before* the boost from mega-vessel mania has passed
- Capex spend up, unit revenue down** – how do terminal operators maintain margins?
- Winners “lock in” volume** (e.g. Colombo? Singapore?) and establish a virtuous circle, become mega transshipment (& gateway) hubs; losers, even some smaller gateways see IE volume routed via a third port, increasing cost of import/export?



Productivity Battleground

Relative performance versus competitors is first objective

- Lines focus on berth productivity and more importantly port productivity
- Competition is always relative – **improvement over year has to exceed competitor’s to increase competitiveness**
- Terminal operator wants high asset utilization – TEUs/quay crane, berth (TEUs/m/pa), etc.
- But high asset utilization for terminal operators may be viewed as ‘congestion’ by lines
- Commercial operators must deliver competitive productivity, whilst maintaining asset utilization.....state backed entities may be less constrained / more focused on chasing volumes

N America Berth Productivity*				Asia Berth Productivity*			
Vessel Size	2012	2013	Change	Vessel Size	2012	2013	Change
10,000 & Over	N/A	83	N/A	10,000 & Over	110	121	10%
7,501 to 10,000	78	88	13%	7,501 to 10,000	98	112	14%
5,001 to 7,500	56	66	18%	5,001 to 7,500	80	96	20%
2,501 to 5,000	44	56	27%	2,501 to 5,000	63	75	19%
2,500 or Less	28	36	29%	2,500 or Less	42	53	26%

Notes: *No of total container moves (on-load, off-load, & re-positioning) divided by no of hours during which vessel is at berth. Comparisons are not “apple for apple” - some data are for ports some for single terminal. Breakdown by call size would offer better ‘standardisation’

Source: IHS / JOC

Top 5 Berth Productivity by Region 2014*

Americas

Balboa	99
Baltimore	84
Lazaro Cardenas	82
Pointe a Pitre Guadeloupe	80
Los Angeles	76


Europe / Middle East / Africa

Jebel Ali	131
Khor Fakkan	100
Khalifa	97
Salalah	96
Bremerhaven	90



Asia

Tianjin	127
Qingdao	126
Yantian	119
Yokohama	112
Nansha	106

Ports of the Future – New Technology, New Ways of thinking, New Ways of Competing?





- More of the same but a bit better (e.g. VICT, Melbourne; Maasvlakte 2, Rotterdam)...
- ...or a step change in design & operations?
- **But what is the return on investment and are customers willing to pay for superior productivity?**



Can Terminal Operators Maintain Their Margins?

What impact from mega-vessels, alliances, increased capex requirements and downward pressure on terminal charges?



Source: Annual Reports; ICF Analysis; Arcadis
Notes: EBITDA / Revenue; recent PSA performance to be confirmed

Wrap: impacts on BIMP-EAGA transshipment potential

Governments, Port Authorities and port developers should work with the grain of the market

- The SE Asia international transshipment market is the biggest in the world and highly competitive
- Name of the game is “scale”, with a limited number of mega-alliances to go around
- To compete requires building high volumes of high spec capacity, **ahead of demand**, and for limited yield per lift
- There is considerable risk of wasting public funds to subsidise AN Other international transshipment hub
- BIMP-EAGA ports should generally focus on gateway cargo, with possibility of some domestic transshipment where networks and volumes make sense. Roro also an option
- Not everyone can be a “mega-hub”nor needs to be



Thank you

Any questions?



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